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Fragmented Realities: The ‘Sectarianisation’ of Space among Iraqi Shi’is in London 




How do the spaces we inhabit shape our lived experiences? And how do those lived experiences 
in turn come to shape and influence our political subjectivity? Such questions are rendered all the 
more important in studies of migrant or diasporic populations who, by definition, conduct their 
daily lives in spaces and places that were initially alien to them. The way in which migrants 
interact with the spaces around them can tell us much about the community and political and 
religious engagements they invest in, as well as the very real way in which they experience their 
local milieu. Through a detailed study of Iraqi Shi’is living in London, specifically in the north-
western Borough of Brent, this paper will seek to trace the ways in which religious institutions 
have carved up the physical and social landscape of North London in ways that have enduring 
effect on the communities with which they engage. The increasing diversification of different 
religious establishments, I argue, has led to a fragmentation of the city-as-lived, in which the vast 
majority of practising Iraqi Shi’is engage with only small isolated pockets of the urban 
environment on a daily basis. Moreover, the growing number of specifically Shi’a schools, 
charities, mosques, community centres and other such institutions has resulted in what I call a 
“sectarianisation” of space in Brent, in which differently practising Muslim sects inhabit different 
spaces within the city despite often living within metres of each other. Drawing on a mixture of 
interviews, participant observation, and mapping techniques, I bring together theory and 
practice in order to sketch out the ways migrant lives can come to be localised in certain spaces, 
and what that can ultimately mean in terms of their political subjectivity and engagement.  
 




The city as a site of lived experience provides a unique manifestation of the social relations of 
which it is a part. In particular, the cultural and ethnic fabric of the urban environment is both a 
product of, and productive of specific ethno-cultural notions regarding identity, belonging, self, 
and other. In so-called “global” cities such as London, the social reality of living in close proximity 
to difference – whether manifested in terms of class, culture, race, ethnicity, religion, or 
otherwise – is a key part of the urban landscape, and has profound implications for the forms of 
political and social subjectivities cultivated within and as a result of such an environment. For 
immigrants and minority groups, in particular, the ethno-social make-up of the city can 
contribute to a subjective sense of marginalisation and alienation as different areas come to be 
divided up and “ghettoised” through mechanisms of social and geographical exclusion (Sibley 
2003). The way in which migrants and other minorities interact with the spaces around them can 
tell us much about the community and political and religious engagements they invest in, as well 
as the very real way in which they experience their local milieu. In this way, a focus on the urban 
environment can contribute to a detailed textural understanding of identity, difference, and 
subject formation in the daily lives of minority groups. 
 
In this paper, I present a study of Iraqi Shi’is living in London, specifically in the north-western 
Borough of Brent, in order to trace how Shi’a religious institutions have carved up the physical 
and social landscape of north London in ways that have an enduring effect on the communities 
with which they engage. Drawing on more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
amongst Iraqi Shi’i communities in London between 2014-2016 as part of my doctoral research,1 
I argue that the increasing diversification of different Shi’a religious establishments has led to a 
fragmentation of the city-as-lived, in which the vast majority of practising Iraqi Shi’is engage with 
only small isolated pockets of the urban environment on a daily basis. Moreover, the growing 
number of specifically Shi’a schools, charities, mosques, community centres and other such 
institutions has resulted in what I call a “sectarianisation” of space in Brent, in which differently 
practising Muslim sects inhabit different spaces within the city despite often living in close 
proximity to each other. This sectarianisation forms part of a wider political economy of Shi’a 
religiosity in Europe in which competing regional and international powers (in particular Iraq 
and Iran) use financial and material resources to serve their own interests, often at the expense 
of ordinary Shi’is themselves, and ties in with theoretical insights provided through disciplines 
such as urban theory where the landscape of the city is understood as the physical embodiment 
of capitalist modes of production and consumption (Harvey 1989a, 1989b, 2013; Schmid 2006; 
Sibley 2003). 
 
The focus on religiously practising Iraqi Shi’is2 is significant for three reasons. Firstly, Shi’a 
Muslims have mostly been overlooked in studies investigating the status of Muslim minorities in 
Britain, and their experiences have often been either glossed over or simply relegated to the 
                                                        
1 Throughout the course of my research, I conducted 27 formal and 51 informal interviews with 
practicing Shi’is in London and Iran aged between 16-75, and attended the annual programme of 
religious events for ‘Ashura and Muharram in 2014 and 2015, including four public marches in 
central London. I also attended everyday personal and religious events, such as weddings, 
funerals, birthday parties, charity fundraisers, and talks at religious and cultural institutions 
(many of which had links to other Shi’a organisations around the world), and collated printed 
and written material from such events. 
2 It should be noted that this paper only deals with religiously practicing Iraqi Shi’a Muslims (i.e. 
those who pray on a regular basis, attend majalis at husseiniyat and other religious insitutions, 
and self-identify as Shi’a Muslim) and does not deal with Iraqis from alternative ethno-religious 
backgrounds, whether that be secular, atheist, Sunni Arab, Kurdish, Jewish, or Christian.  
status of a caveat or footnote in more mainstream studies on Sunni Muslims (Bowen 2014; Cesari 
2004; Gale and Hopkins 2009; Grewal 2014; Meer 2010; Modood 2003, 2005; Roy 2004, among 
others; see the introduction to this special issue for more details); and thus the time is ripe for a 
more detailed study that treats Shi’a Muslims as an object of analysis in and of themselves. 
Secondly, Iraqi Shi’is are demographically and practically dominant in the urban environment of 
London, a status that is reflected in the fact that the majority of Shi’a Muslim institutions in the 
city tend to be founded and run by Iraqis (though Iranians and Khojas – East African Shi’is of 
South Asian origin – also play a significant role). Finally, the focus on practicing Shi’is of Iraqi 
national background is significant as a result of the specific historical and socio-political 
circumstances of the Iraqi diaspora and the highly politicised nature of Shi’ism in contemporary 
Iraq, where a violent form of sectarianism has become an increasingly salient fact of social and 
political life.  
 
The paper will begin with an exploration of urban theory in a way that makes explicit the 
relationship between the built and social environments, before moving on to a detailed 
ethnographic account of the ethno-sectarian landscape of north-west London as seen through the 
prism of the notorious “Shi’a triangle” in order to highlight the ways in which the inscription of 
ethno-religious identity onto the urban fabric can be understood as the physical manifestation of 
a divisive politics of sectarianism. Specifically, it is my contention that the increasing visibility 
engendered by a burgeoning sense of a specifically “Shi’a” Muslim identity amongst Iraqi Shi’is in 
London is reflected in the shifting dynamics of the urban environment where Shi’a religious 
establishments are breaking away from historical political and social links to Iraq and 
diversifying in a way that reproduces the fragmentation and sectarianisation of Shi’a Muslim 
identity in Britain. Moreover, this process of sectarianisation is not simply a benign product of 
the lived environment but has been cultivated as the result of a logic of religious commodification 
and objectification that is actively encouraged by geopolitical actors who manipulate the political 
economy of Shi’a religiosity in ways that further their own strategic interests.3 
  
Living in Space: Between Social Constructivism and Critical Materialism 
The enduring allure of the city – the orderly chaos of a multitude of human lives being played out 
simultaneously on the same urban stage – is one that has been invoked time and again in the 
study of politics and social relations. In the past few decades, while theorists such as Lefebvre 
(1991, 1996) and Foucault (1991) have contributed to our understanding of urban space as both 
a product of and a contributor to social relations, urban geographers such as Harvey (1989a, 
1989b, 2013) and Schmid (2006) have gone further in specifying the relationship between 
cityscapes and the logic of capitalist economy. Such debates reflect a spectrum of contemporary 
                                                        
3 Arguably, the ethno-religious carving up of space in London can also be seen as a product of 
British state multiculturalism and ethnonormativity (Ramy 2015). However, such a policy-
oriented analysis falls outside the scope of the current enquiry and as such is not developed 
further here. 
discourses within urban theory that fall within the two poles of social and materialist 
approaches; the former viewing urban space as “a tool capable of orchestrating and transforming 
the social life it contains” (Sarkis 1993: 104) while the latter considers the built environment as a 
product and an instrument of capitalist production. The argument of this paper falls somewhere 
in the middle of these two approaches. Following Lefebvre (1996: 101), who maintained that 
social space is “a materialisation of ‘social being’” – the social writ large – I take the social 
constructivist view of the city as a manifestation and reflection of social life as a starting point 
from which to map out and theorise the role of Shi’a religious spaces in London. However, in 
seeking to move beyond simply chronicling the spatialisation of Iraqi Shi’a ethno-religious 
identity in London I also explore how the creation, use, and maintenance of such religiously- and 
ethnically-inscribed spaces are themselves a product of capitalist forces of objectification, 
commodification, and political economy. Specifically, I wish to argue that the physical and 
psychic carving-up of the urban fabric of London into religiously and ethnically defined spaces of 
exclusion is both reflective and productive of a logic of sectarianism fuelled by a political 
economy of difference and exclusion.  
 
Such an analysis draws on the Lefebvrian notion of three overlapping modes of space: the 
perceived, the conceived and the lived (Lefebvre 1996). The first of these, “perceived space”, 
designates the physical reality of space, the way in which it is configured, produced and used 
through social practice. “Lived space”, on the other hand, describes the way in which people 
negotiate and inhabit everyday life within the confines of the space in which they find 
themselves.  Finally, “conceived space” refers to the imagined, abstract space in which the signs 
and codes of the city are inscribed and through which the inhabitants make sense of their 
surroundings. This paper seeks to draw together the diverse strands of these three 
understandings of social and urban space in order to show how the physical perceived space of 
north-west London has shaped the ways in which individuals come to live, move, and conceive of 
the space around them in ways that are productive of specific kinds of identity and subjectivity. 
In this way, rather than serving as a mere reflection of the social reality of “being Iraqi-Shi’a in 
London”, the ethno-religious spaces of areas such as Cricklewood, Ealing, Kilburn, Queen’s Park, 
and Wembley also represent the ways in which various social, material, and political forces work 
to produce particular ethnic economies that contribute to the sectarianisation of both mental and 
physical space in the city (Kaplan 1998; Smith 1992; Yiftachel and Yacobi 2003). 
 
Having thus briefly outlined some of the theoretical contours shaping this project, I now wish to 
sketch a detailed portrait of the social and lived environment of practicing Iraqi Shi’is in London 
based on my own ethnographic research in the field. 
 
Baghdad-on-Thames: Iraqi Shi’is in context 
Shi’a Muslims make up around 15 percent of the estimated 2.7 million Muslims currently living in 
Britain (Spellman-Poots, 2012),4  and come from a variety of socio-economic, ethno-national, 
political, and educational backgrounds; though the vast majority tend to be of Middle-Eastern 
origin, coming from countries as diverse as Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
and Afghanistan (there are also significant numbers from South Asia and East Africa). The 
predominantly Arab and Middle-Eastern origins of Shi’a Muslims in the UK thus contrasts with 
the dominant Sunni Muslim population mostly characterised by immigrants of South Asian origin 
(Meer, 2010; Modood, 2005, 2010). Although there are no accurate data regarding the ethno-
national origins of Shi’a Muslims in Britain (the UK census does not record religious sect), in 
sheer physical terms, Iraqis and Iranians tend to dominate the institutional religious fabric of the 
city. In a self-claimed “exhaustive” directory of Shi’a religious establishments provided by the 
website arbaeen.co.uk, of the 19 London-based institutions listed, nearly half (nine) are run by 
Iraqis, while a quarter (four) are Iranian-run5 (the rest are a mixture of South-Asian, Khoja, 
Lebanese, and minority Shi’a sects such as Ismailis).6 It is due to their demographic dominance of 
London-based Shi’a Muslims that Iraqi Shi’is are fundamental to both the physical and mental 
contours of this minority religious group. 
 
According to the 2011 Census of Britain, there are an estimated 73,000 Iraqi-born individuals 
living in the UK, with the vast majority concentrated in London (Office for National Statistics, 
2013). However, since this figure is neither up to date nor takes into account second or third-
generation Iraqis born in Britain (not to mention those born in exile who later settled in the UK), 
it is safe to assume that the total number of Iraqis in the UK is much higher.7 The most significant 
waves of Iraqi emigration over the last few decades have coincided with a number of key political 
events in Iraq itself; and different political conditions in the homeland have led to differences in 
the economic, political, and sectarian demographics of Iraqis in exile. By far the largest wave of 
Iraqi migration to the UK took place under the regime of Saddam Hussain from 1979-2003, and 
for this reason was mostly (but not exclusively) characterised by middle- and lower-class Iraqi 
Shi’is (whether practicing or secular) (Al-Ali 2007; Al-Rasheed 1991; Saleh 2011; Spellman-Poots 
2012). In this sense, the demographic dominance of Iraqis Shi’s both amongst British Shi’a 
                                                        
4 Addley (2003), quoting the 2001 British census, suggests that there may be as many as 400,000 
Shi’a Muslims in the UK, the majority coming from Iraq and Iran. 
5 It should be noted that as a result of the politics of the Iranian regime, and especially the fallout 
of the 1979 Islamic revolution, the majority of Iranians in Britain tend to be religiously secular 
and non-practicing, hence the dominance of Iraqis (Gholami 2016; Spellman-Poots 2012) 
6 www.arbaeenuk.com/directorylist, accessed 25 Sept 2016. According to my own fieldwork 
data, 11 of the 15 Shi’a religious institutions in north-west London were founded or run by Iraqis. 
This figure does not include secular or non-religious Iraqi-run establishments, such as the Iraqi 
Cultural Centre, Al-Muntada Institute, or the London headquarters of the Iraqi Communist Party. 
7 For example, Saleh (2011) gives the total number of Iraqis in the UK as of 2005 as being 
between 282,000 and 350,000, while Al-Ali (2007) gives a lower estimate of 100,000, and the 
Iraqi Embassy estimates between 350,000 and 400,000. In a comprehensive mapping exercise 
conducted in 2007, the IOM suggests there are a total of 240,000 Iraqis in the UK, including 
125,000 in London alone (IOM, 2007) 
Muslims and within the Iraqi diaspora itself makes this community an ideal case study for 
exploring the intra-communal dynamics within British Islam, and in particular of scrutinising the 
ways in which identity practices such as the production and use of urban space may either fuel or 
mitigate existing sectarian and political tensions between different Islamic sects in the UK. 
 
For Iraqi Shi’is in the UK, the establishment and maintenance of religious institutions such as 
hussainiyyaat (“Shi’a mosques”, sing. husseiniyya) became especially important in exile as a result 
of the social and political status of Shi’is in Iraq – the practice and observance of Shi’a rituals, for 
example, was banned under the Saddam regime. As a result of such converging social and 
political factors, such Shi’a religious institutions in exile assumed a significant political dimension 
in the emancipatory articulation of a hitherto suppressed Shi’a religious identity (Flynn, 2013), 
and, moreover, allowed Iraqis in exile to connect with others who found themselves in similar 
positions. Thus, ‘from the outset, there [was] an emphasis on the political dimension on the [Iraqi 
Shi’a] community and its political expression as part of its particular identity’ (Flynn 2013: 3). In 
other words, the mediation of the exile experience through the religious institutions of the 
hussainiyaat plausibly contributed to a diasporic identity that came to be intimately linked with 
Shi’a religiosity and political emancipation. This is a theme that will be explored further in the 
following section, but at this juncture it suffices to highlight the inherently politicised nature of 
Iraqi Shi’is in London and the potential role that this demographically dominant, politically-
engaged, exiled community may have had in shaping both the physical terrain of urban London 
through the founding of Shi’a religious establishments, and the cultivating of a politicised, ethno-
sectarian understanding of Shi’a religious identity grounded in the political legacy of the Iraqi 
Ba’thist state. 
 
“Najaf in Brent” 
 
Britain’s equivalent [of the Shi’a crescent”] is a triangle… Fanning out from a point among 
the Arab cafes of central London’s Edgware Road, the Shi’ite centres of population and 
influence are to be found to the north and west in the boroughs of Brent, Westminster and 
Harrow. (Bowen 2014: 135) 
 
Although Shi’a Muslims in London, as in the rest of Britain, remain in the minority in comparison 
to their Sunni counterparts, there is a particular sliver of northwest London where Shi’a religious 
institutions not only hold their own, but have even come to dominate the Islamic scene. This 
concentration of Shi’a religious institutions and activity in the boroughs of Brent, Westminster, 
and Harrow – especially the neighbourhoods of Wembley, Cricklewood, Kilburn, Queen’s Park 
and Brondesbury (see Fig. 1). – has resulted in the tongue-in-cheek moniker of “Najaf in Brent” 
(Bowen 2014), a reference to the Shi’a religious seminaries of the southern Iraqi city of Najaf, the 
home of Shi’ism’s highest-ranking religious source of emulation Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Hussaini 
Al-Sistani. Due to the hierarchical nature of Shi’a Islam, in which high-ranking religious scholars 
(known as maraji’, sing. marja’), create theological rulings which are then followed by ordinary 
practicing Shi’is, the existence of “Najaf in Brent” is intimately tied to the Shi’a religious 
establishment in Iraq (known as the marja’iyya) through the institutionalisation of religious 
doctrine and practice. Many Iraqi Shi’is were expelled under Saddam Hussein precisely because 
of their connection to the religious schools and seminaries of these cities (as well as their ties to 
Iran following the 1979 revolution), and have continued to maintain these links in exile. The 
majority of London-based institutions thus have direct links to the Shi’a religious seminaries 
(hawzas) in the shrine cities, and serve as the official representative of different clerical figures 




Fig. 1 – Map showing the main religious institutions in the “Shi’a triangle” 
of North-West London (Source: Author’s fieldwork) 
 
Because Shi’a theology requires individuals to “follow” a particular marja’ in matters of religious 
practice and jurisprudence, different institutions in London affiliated to different maraji’ have 
thus come to reflect different schools of thought within Shi’a Islam, and especially when it comes 
to political orientations towards the Islamic Republic of Iran (see Table 1). 
 
Name  Ethnonational 
background 
Location Political (Religious) Affiliation 
Imam Khoei Islamic Centre Iraqi Queen’s Park Najaf (Khoei/Sistani) 
Al-Sadiq & Al-Zahra schools Iraqi Queen’s Park Najaf (Khoei/Sistani) 
Islamic Centre of England Iranian Maida Vale Iran (Khomeini) 
Imam Ali Foundation Iraqi Willesden Najaf (Sistani) 
Rasul Al-Atham  Iraqi Cricklewood Iran (Shirazi) 
Dar Al-Islam Iraqi Cricklewood Da’wa Party (Sadr) 
Imam Al-Jawad Centre Iraqi Willesden Najaf (Sistani) 
Belaghiya Iraqi Brent Cross Najaf 
Holland Park Mosque Iranian Holland Park Iran  
AhlulBayt Foundation Iraqi Willesden Najaf (Sistani) 
World AhlulBayt Islamic 
League 
Indo-Pakistani Kensal Green Najaf 
Muhammadi Trust Iranian/Iraqi Willesden Najaf 
Imam Hussein Mosque Lebanese Kilburn Najaf (Fadhlallah) 
 
Table 1 – Major Shi’a Institutions in northwest London by background and affiliation 
 
In practice, this means that the personal and political rivalries between different schools of Shi’a 
thought have been written into the urban fabric of London through the institutionalisation of the 
marja’iyya in the city. As one of my research participants, Ali M, explained, mapping out the 
various spheres of different Shi’a theological and political influence in London: 
 
AM: [Al-Khoei Foundation, Ahlulbayt Foundation, Salaam Foundation, Imam Ali 
Foundation and al-Hakim Foundation]; this is one big happy family. This is Najaf in 
Brent. Then you have the [Islamic Centre of England].… this is what I call “Iran”, 
when we say Iran we mean the government. [Then] over here we have another 
sect, we’ll call these shiraziyya, Shirazis. And they have Rasul Al-‘Atham, which is 
the biggest husseiniya in London. 
EDE: Where’s that? 
AM: Cricklewood. q 1 
EDE: And what… who are they? 
AM: They’re the Shirazis [i.e. followers of Shirazi]… They basically call themselves 
the Karbala’is. 
EDE: Oh ok 
AM: They’re the… if I put it to you, these are the extreme Right… in terms of their 
theology 
EDE: So extremely orthodox? 
AM: Yeah. They’re the ones with the tatbir8 and everything. Full on… And if we say 
these guys [points to Dar Al Islam], Da’wa and that, they’re the lefties. 
EDE: Ok. And who are Najaf? They’re not political are they? 
                                                        
8 Controversial ritual cutting of the forehead practiced by certain strands of Shi’a Muslims and 
banned by the religious establishment in Najaf (though not in Iran). 
AM: They’re not political, but they’re in the middle. We say that they’re, what we 
call it, the right path… Whoever’s backed by Najaf is in charge of everything.9 
 
This polarisation of political and theological opinion within the Shi’a religious establishment 
means that in London, the choice of which Shi’a religious institution to frequent is often 
indicative of the politics of the individuals concerned, and is physically mapped onto the fabric of 
the city. For example, the Iraqi-run Dar Al-Islam is both a religious institution and the 
headquarters of the Islamic Da’wa Party in London; for this reason, Shi’is who frequent this 
establishment tend to have political leanings sympathetic to the current Iraqi government. 
Conversely, the Al-Khoei Foundation, the oldest and most widely known Shi’a institution in the 
UK,10 was originally established in 1989 as the London office of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abu Al-
Qasim al-Khoei (the predecessor of Sistani), and as a result has very close ties to the Iraqi 
religious establishment in Najaf but distances itself from Iraqi domestic politics. At the other end 
of the political spectrum, the Iranian-run Islamic Centre of England (ICE) has close ties to the 
Islamic Republic and although tends to maintain good relations with Najaf harbours a number of 
fundamental theological disagreements especially with regards to the Iranian state doctrine of 
wilayat al-faqih. Known as the Guardianship of the Jurist, this doctrine allows a designated 
scholar to assume political guardianship of the Shi’a umma in the absence of the twelfth Imam, 
and was first popularised by Ayatolah Khomeini, who used it as a basis for Iranian Islamic 
revolution of 1979 – indeed, to this day, support for wilayat al-faqih is often seen as synonymous 
for support for the Iranian regime, and therefore inflected with political undertones. 
 
Beyond politics, towards an “(Iraqi-)Shi’a” identity in London 
The various political and religious divisions within the Shi’a establishment are thus reflected in 
the multiple and competing institutions vying for the patronage of  Shi’is in London. 
Nevertheless, one of my predominant observations gleaned from frequenting such institutions is 
that for practicing Iraqi Shi’is in London, the choice of which hussainiyya to attend on a particular 
day is often shaped as much by social and familial ties than by religious doctrine or ideology. 
During the Islamic month of Muharram, for example, a significant religious occasions for 
practicing Shi’is, I noticed that individuals would often attend different institutions on different 
days, or even attend several in the same night, often dictated by the preferences of family and 
friends.11 One of my research participants, Um Zainab, a middle-aged Iraqi woman with a close-
knit female friendship group, even spent several hours a day during Muharram calling up each of 
her friends to find out where they were going that evening and to arrange transport and lift 
                                                        
9 Interview 6. 
10 The Al-Khoei Foundation is often upheld by the British government as the representative of the 
Shi’a Muslim voice in the UK – a status that is not always corroborated by individuals in the 
community. 
11 For the younger generation, the choice of which hussainiyya to attend is often dictated by the 
particular orator speaking on a given night, with some English-language speakers attracting large 
and devout followings. 
sharing. For Abu Dalia, on the other hand, a young Iraqi-born man who moved to the UK as a 
child, the most important factor in deciding which husseiniyya to attend is the quality and type of 
the food handed out at the end of each religious service (Author’s fieldnotes). 
 
Despite internal communal divisions, then, the concentration of Iraqi Shi’a religious centres and 
institutions in one corner of northwest London has arguably shaped the lived experience of 
practicing Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora such that individuals often speak about feeling part of an 
“(Iraqi-)Shi’a community” that is defined through its relation to the material and social fabric of 
the city of London. More than this, the very geography of London itself has come to define the 
boundaries of particular religious and social groupings, concentrated around the different Shi’a 
religious and political establishments. For example, a recurring trope encountered during the 
research process was of the difference between Iraqi Shi’is living and frequenting different areas 
of London, especially the neighbourhoods of Kingston, Ealing, and Wembley. As one of my 
research participants explained: 
 
The [Iraqi] Shi’a community breaks down into different ethnicities and different schools 
of thought; it’s group thinking. For example, you have what’s known as the Wembley 
Iraqis, the Ealing Iraqis, and the Kingston Iraqis. The Wembley Iraqis tend to be 
traditional, religious and working class; the Ealing Iraqis tend to be liberal and higher 
class, but still religious; and the Kingston Iraqis tend to be liberal and secular, they often 
see themselves as British. Me, for example, I’m from Wembley, because I grew up there, 
but I’m “Ealing”: I’m not traditional-style religious, I focus more on principles.12 
 
In this way, the proliferation of Shi’a religious, political, and civil society institutions in Wembley 
(Lefebvre’s “perceived space”) is seen as shaping the levels of religious conservatism and 
political orientation of Iraqi Shi’is living in this area (“lived space”). This, in turn, serves to 
contribute to the consolidation of a specifically Shi’a politico-religious identity, one in which Iraqi 
national belonging becomes tempered with and superseded by ethno-sectarian articulations and 
inscribed onto the physical fabric of the city (“conceived space”). In the words of one of my 
interviewees, “Wembley” Iraqi Shi’is in London thus increasingly tend to “see their Iraqiness as 
Shi’aness; they show how Iraqi they are by being more and more Shi’a.”13 Conversely, “Kingston” 
Iraqis tend to eschew religious identification for more secular forms of belonging, which often 
manifests itself as a distancing from Shi’a-inflected Iraqi organisations and institutions and a 
greater level of integration in British society as a whole:14 “they often see themselves as 
                                                        
12 Interview 21.  
13 Interview 23. 
14 Informal conversations with O Kadhum and Mohammed M.  
British.”15 In this way, for the religiously devout “Wembley” Iraqis whose social reality is shaped 
by the institutions of “Najaf in Brent”, the identity categories of “Iraqi” and “Shi’a” increasingly 
blur into each other such that articulation of one is seen as identification with the other.  
 
As well as shaping the lived reality of Iraqi Shi’is in London through the institutionalisation of 
Shi’a religiosity into the fabric of the city itself, Shi’a religious and civil society establishments in 
the UK also offered a place for the fostering of communal ties and social belonging. For example, 
many of the young British-born Iraqis Shi’is I interviewed described how as children growing up 
in London in the 1990s their parents would regularly take them to the hussainiyya as a way to 
meet other Iraqis exiled in the UK and to exchange gossip and news. One interviewee, a secular 
Iraqi from a Shi’a background who fled the country as a young man in 1980 out of fear of being 
targeted by Saddam Hussein’s regime, spoke about how he would often visit hussainiyyaat in 
London during the 1991 Gulf War as a way to keep up to date with developments in Iraq: 
 
I don’t consider myself a religious man but I started to go to the mosque, or to the 
hussainiyya in ‘91 just to get the fresh news from Baghdad. Because there by faxes the 
news was coming by minutes [sic].16 
 
In this sense, the hussainiyyaat and other Shi’a institutions acted as social and community “glue” 
that kept exiled Iraqi Shi’is together and allowed them to stay in touch both with each other and 
with developments “back home” in Iraq. In the London context, the hussainiyyaat engendered a 
sense of community by acting as a physical meeting place for diasporic Iraqi Shi’is; one that was 
simultaneously inscribed with religious meaning through the observance of rites and practices 
and that was oriented towards religious and political engagement with domestic developments 
in Iraq. Many of these institutions also maintain direct links to the political and religious 
establishment in Iraq (as outlined above) and act as channels for diasporic Iraqis to send and 
receive money, resources, and information across state borders. Thus, only in exile did the notion 
of “Shi’ism” as an institutionally-defined religious and political community come to play a 
dominant role in the self-perception of Iraqi Shi’is who had, while in Iraq, identified themselves 
through varying political, social, and demographic affiliations. For example, many Shi’is prior to 
                                                        
15 Interview 21. It is also worth noting here that the demographic of Iraqi Shi’is who settled in 
Kingston is slightly different from that of Iraqis in North and West London. There is a larger 
proportion of Iraqis who came prior to the political exile of the 1980s, and the majority tend to 
be more affluent than those in other parts of London. Although Iraqis in London come from 
diverse social and economic backgrounds, those who were forced to flee or were deported often 
struggled to find good employment in the UK, and I spoke to numerous engineers, doctors, 
lawyers, and other qualified professionals living in North and West London who are working as 
taxi drivers and in pizza shops since their English wasn’t good enough. Because many Iraqis in 
Kingston came either to pursue higher education here or simply boasted better connections, this 
has resulted in a socio-economic and class division that didn’t necessarily exist back in Iraq. 
16 Interview 4. 
leaving Iraq saw themselves as primarily Najafis or Kerbala’is17 (inhabitants of the southern Iraqi 
cities of Najaf and Karbala), Communists or Da’wa Party members, secularists or nationalists – 
rather than as Shi’is in and of themselves. In this way, it wasn’t so much the commonality of Shi’a 
religious conviction (many of those in exile had vastly divergent views of religion) than the 
experience of meeting and socialising within a religiously-defined space that led to the 
construction of a sense of communal religious and political identity articulated in relation to the 
“homeland” of Iraq. Moreover, this notion of an “Iraqi” community in London came to be 
intimately tied to a sense of Shi’a religiosity as a result of the way in which Iraqi-run husseiniyaat 
doubled as spaces of communal belonging and religious practices. 
 
Fragmented realities: Ethno-sectarianism in the city   
As well as being in the demographic majority comparative to other Shi’is, Iraqi Shi’is in London 
have well-established and active religious and civil society institutions through which individuals 
are able to mobilise, both in terms of orientation towards Iraq itself and in terms of their political 
and religious views towards entities such as the Iranian regime, and, more recently, against the 
Islamic State (also known as ISIS). It is this network of Shi’a politico-religious institutions, many 
of which are explicitly geared towards social and political engagement in Iraq, that has 
contributed to the sectarianisation of the symbolic and material diasporic space in which 
different parts of London have come to be associated with different theological and political 
interpretations of what it means to be “Shi’a” and “Iraqi” in Britain. Arguably, the 
institutionalisation of Shi’ism in the urban fabric of London, and the material and discursive links 
between Shi’a spaces in the city and those in Iraq and Iran, have contributed to the crystallisation 
of an ethno-sectarian sense of communal and religious identity in which Shi’a religiosity has 
come to be intimately linked with Iraqi national belonging. Moreover, the physical inscription of 
Shi’a religiosity onto London’s urban landscape has also resulted in bracketing off areas of the 
city as Shi’a-dominant “ghettos” where Muslims of different sects rarely interact, even if they live 
in close proximity to each other. One example of this is the proximity of Regent’s Park Mosque 
and the Islamic Centre of England – each of these religious establishments is formerly a mosque, 
and thus in theory open to Muslims (and non-Muslims) of all denominations; and yet in practice 
the former is frequented almost exclusively by Sunnis and the latter by Shi’is. As one of my 
interviewees explained, describing his experience of living close to Edgware Road: 
 
AM: I hate this area that I live in because we have this stupid Regent’s Park Mosque 
here… 
EDE: What’s wrong with Regent’s Park Mosque? 
AM: They’re very undercover, but they support terrorism.  
                                                        
17 Indeed, these regional rivalries have even seeped into the diasporic experience through the 
way in which different Shi’a religious establishments are seen as being “Najafi” or “Karbala’i” – 
one hussainiya in particular, Rasul al-‘Atham, is even known informally as “al-Karbala’iyya” (“the 
Karbala’i one”). 
EDE: What do you mean? 
AM: Like, for example, they invited [X]. He is like the biggest person who, who hates 
Shi’is and called for everyone to cut Shi’is heads off. They invited him to give lectures 
there. 
EDE: Really? 
AM: Yeah. You see all these beardy-weirdys [sic]… Do you know what I mean? It’s 
become… you know, sometimes I get, I feel uncomfortable walking. 
EDE: Really? 
AM: Yeah. And we’ve even done, in our lobby group, we’ve done experiments. One of our 
friends, he went to pray in a Sunni mosque and they told him to leave. 
EDE: So you never pray in Sunni mosques? Even though Regent’s Park Mosque is right 
here you never go? 
AM: No… It’s very sad. The other day somebody went to Regent’s Park Mosque, he put 
down a torba,18 he wanted to pray, and they kicked it out of in front of him.19 
 
Although it is difficult to verify the truth of this information, what is clear is that this young man 
feels intimidated by what he considers to be “beardy-weirdys” (a reference to the Salafi style of 
wearing a long beard and shaving the moustache) and never frequents Regent’s Park Mosque, 
even though it is the closest to him, preferring instead to travel further north to frequent the 
Imam Jawad Foundation and Al-Khoei Centre. Earlier in the same interview, the man had claimed 
that Sunni ideology was “flawed” and argued that “these are the same people whose forefathers 
killed Imam Hussein” in reference to ISIS. In this sense, we can see how the politics of 
sectarianism finds physical manifestation in the urban environment of London through the 
creation of Shi’a-dominated areas and the shift away from inclusive Islamic mosques and centres 
in the city and towards those defined by affiliation to a particular sect or ideology. 
 
Such forms of politico-religious sectarianism, I wish to stress, do not emanate from some form of 
anterior ethno-sectarian “essence”, but rather represent “a modern constitutive Foucauldian 
socioeconomic and political power that produces and reproduces sectarian subjects and modes 
of political subjectification and [is] mobilisation through a dispersed ensemble of institutional, 
clientelist, and discursive practices” (Salloukh et al. 2015: 3). In the case of Iraqi Shi’is in London, 
the reification of Shi’a “groupness” (Brubaker, 2002) through the proliferation of Shi’a religious 
and civil society organisations has contributed to the crystallisation of what it means to be “Shi’a” 
in the context of Islamic London in a way that often explicitly constructs different Islamic sects in 
a logic of mutual exclusion. In particular, the consolidation of the “Shia triangle” in northwest 
London has led to a concentration of Shi’a Muslims in certain neighbourhoods and to the 
polarisation of London between “Sunni” East London and “Shi’a” (North) West London. In 
                                                        
18 Clay tablet used by Shi’a Muslims during prayer. 
19 Interview 6. 
practice, this has come to mean that even though Sunnis and Shi’is in London may both inhabit 
the same physical space (Lefebvre’s “perceived space”) – such as living in and around Edgware 
Road – individuals belonging to differently practicing Islamic sects no longer move among those 
spaces in the same way, preferring instead to frequent religious institutions geared specifically to 
their sectarian needs; thus leading to a fragmentation of the city-as-lived and the city-as-
conceived. It is for this reason that individuals such as AM come to feel “uncomfortable” when 
walking down the street in certain parts of the city; the discord between their psychic 
understanding of their place in the urban fabric and the physical reality of the built environment 
can lead to a sense of unease and a desire to surround themselves with the “familiarity” of those 
who think and act like themselves. This all-too-human need for the familiar becomes politicised 
when the dividing lines between sameness and difference, “us” and “them”, become defined by 
ethno-religious categories such as Islamic sect. Such self-imposed segregation is further 
compounded, moreover, by the growth of what Kaplan (1998) calls “ethnic economies”, urban 
areas where business ownership tends to be concentrated in the hands of one particular ethno-
religious group as a result of inter-personal networks and familial ties.  
 
This trend is worrying in and of itself, but especially because such sectarianisation of space in 
London is not simply the product of an organic process of urban living but also the result of a 
deliberate political economy of sectarianism that is propagated and maintained by the interests 
of particular political actors. As the physical manifestation of the social world, the urban 
environment of the city is not simply an inert space in which human beings live and move, but a 
reflection of the social, political, and economic forces that shape human lives (Lefebvre 1996, 
2008; Foucault 1991; Harvey 1989a, 1989b, 2013; Schmid 2006; Sibley 2003). For this reason, 
the physical demarcation of London’s urban fabric into ethno-sectarian enclaves such as the 
“Shi’a triangle” and “Salafi Edgware Road” are indicative of wider sociopolitical forces that are 
working to shape the contours of such sectarian identities in the first place. For example, the 
current Iraqi government, led by the Shi’a Islamic Da’wa Party, is invested in securing symbolic 
and material support from Iraqis in the diaspora, and funds a number of London-based 
institutions aimed at reaching out to sympathetic Iraqi Shi’is in the UK by bolstering their sense 
of ethno-national identity and communal belonging. Similarly, the governments of countries such 
as Iran and Saudi Arabia also fund numerous religious and civil society institutions, schools, 
mosques, charities, and centres in the British capital with the aim of furthering their own 
geopolitical strategic interests.  
 
The results of such a political economy of sectarian politics as played out in the streets and 
boroughs of London have become increasingly visible not only in the parcelling up of different 
areas of the city according to Islamic sect, but also a number of recent sectarian incidents. In May 
2013, for example, a march against the Syrian regime involving Anjem Choudary (the former 
leader of proscribed radical organisation Islam4UK) descended into violence on London’s 
Edgware Road. There are conflicting accounts of what happened, but on the website of (Iranian-
backed) AhlulBayt Islamic Mission, it is claimed that “protesters marched with hardline Salafi 
placards” and “attacked Shi’a passersby”.20 More recently, during the 2015 ‘Ashura march 
through central London, practicing Shi’a Muslims held up banners and placards condemning 
certain interpretations of Sunni Islam, and claiming that “Shi’a Muslims are the biggest victims of 
terrorism”.21 Such examples point to the fact that the sectarian dynamics of geopolitical conflicts 
in the Middle East are increasingly coming to fruition in the segregated urban spaces of London, 
where Sunnis and Shi’is are able to live in close proximity with each other without ever 




This paper has outlined the ways in which the urban fabric of London has been inscribed with 
politically-invested forms of etho-sectarianism through the dividing up of the city-as-lived into 
pseudo enclaves on the basis of religious sect by examining the particular institutions and 
practices of Iraqi Shi’i communities in northwest London. Although space limitations mean that 
the full implications of such sectarianised urban spaces cannot be elaborated here, I hope I have 
begun to lay the groundwork for a study of Shi’a communities in London that takes seriously the 
physical and material environment in which they live, as well as the ways in which these spaces 






                                                        
20  http://www.aimislam.com/salafis-march-against-shia-islam-in-london-attack-shia-passersby-
on-edgware-road/, accessed 30 September 2016. 
21 Author’s fieldnotes. For example, one slogan read: “ISIS are the Yazid of today”, a reference to 
the Sunni caliph Yazid, who is believed by Shi’is to have been involved in the killing of Imam 
Hussain at the Battle of Karbala. 
22 Indeed, even interfaith organisations in London have traditionally focused on building bridges 
between the major world religions, and not between different sects within a single religion; 
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